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ABSTRACT
In this article, I explore the importance and passion for historical
reconstructions by means of media events and public representations.
To this aims, among other illustrative examples, I take issue with the
celebrations to mark the legacy of Emperor Constantine to Christianity
among Southeast European peoples, including Albanians. Similar
celebrations are often used and misused to forward or contest various
claims to immutable ethnic belonging and religious tolerance. They
always support negotiating or challenging ethno-political agendas.
They may show the ways in which historical, cultural and religious
heritage is entangled in identity politics, which could provide new
insights to a better understanding of the politics of religion in
international aﬀairs and everyday life in the Balkans.
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Religion and politics
Much of the philosophical reﬂections about the relations between religion and politics,
prompted by Rawls’s notion of public reason,1 fall within the liberal tradition of religious
restraint,2 which has generated the worrisome backlash of a new traditionalism among
prominent theologians cum political theorists.3 The conceptual middle ground is occupied
by the importance of politics of recognition related to individual freedom and personal
autonomy,4 which makes it even more challenging to adjudicate conﬂicts between religion
and politics. The trigger for religious war is not always or even typically grounded in reli-
gious considerations,5 neither the dynamics and range of ideological wanderings and
© 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
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1John Rawls, Political Liberalism, Expanded ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).
2Robert Audi, Religious Commitment and Secular Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Michael Perry,
Under God? Religious Faith and Liberal Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Richard Rorty, ‘Religion
in the Public Square: A Reconsideration’, Journal of Religious Ethics 31:1 (2003), pp. 141–149; Jürgen Habermas, ‘Religion
in the Public Sphere’, European Journal of Philosophy 14:1 (2006), pp. 1–25; Martha Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience: In
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Vallier, Liberal Politics and Public Faith: Beyond Separation (New York: Routledge, 2014).
3John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005); Alasdair MacIntyre,
After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 3rd ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007); Nicholas Wolterstorﬀ,
The Mighty and the Almighty: An Essay in Political Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
4Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1994); Will Kymlicka,Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
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political implications of religion can be reduced to a universally identiﬁed pattern of
relationship to state policies,6 or to formalistic and factual aspects of personalities and
events. Presumably, many observers and commentators are merely mouthpieces for
either the secular left or the religious right. Similarly, the opinions of politicians are
driven mostly by vested interests and many academic scholars are too gripped by political
correctness to provide any authoritative analysis or practical solutions.
Arguably, we must reverse the perspective and get rid of the fruitless philosophical
debates between new liberalism and conservatism, which seem so enthusiastic about the
demands of essential justice and the pursuit of an essential common good. It may be
rather more proﬁtable to think anthropologically why at a given time the community of
a religious identity becomes a relevant medium for spiritual, cultural, social, or political
mobilization. What local people hold for their identity and their history must be treated
as a discursive ideological construction, for we can reveal its possible situational relevance
or its sociological and political determinants. To build a relatively autonomous analysis of
religious discourses, it is necessary to study the context that produces such ritualized dis-
courses and practices, to convert the interpretations of the actors into data to be inter-
preted, and to incorporate in the subject of study as much their attempts to organize a
memory as their strategies to balance or reverse power relationships. Far from politicizing
and ethnicizing religious issues, a critical and analytical approach must reveal and de-
essentialize the hidden ideological undercurrents of discourses mobilized around religious
identity and political projects.
Extant research and a quite rich and inspiring literature provide suﬃcient evidence on
the important and actively debated issues of the entanglement of historical, cultural and
religious heritage with identity politics and the politics of ethno-religious ideologies
from the late Ottoman Empire to the end of Communism in the Balkans.7 There is not
the place here to review the steady rise of solid studies that after the 1990s address the
ideological foundations and political impact of religious activity in East and Southeast
Europe, neither the increasing publications that document the revitalization of religion
and the de-secularization of Southeast European societies. I rather take issue with histori-
cal reconstructions to show the intricate network of the politics of religion through the
ways in which beliefs collectively held by actors in local society are constructed as
media events and public representations to forward or challenge ethno-political
agendas. I follow an anthropological approach and ethnographic method, including socio-
logical surveys on opinions and interpretations of media events, based mostly on research
in print and social media.
Southeast Europe, including Albania, provides a colorful display of the political func-
tions of religion in what might be called an unholy alliance between religious oﬃcials,
state actors, and intellectual elites to gain political advantage by manipulating the souls
of ordinary people in everyday interactions. To explore these dimensions, I focus on ques-
tions relating to religious and political identity by examining how ethno-political agendas
6Emilio Gentile, Le religioni della politica: fra democrazie e totalitarismi (Roma: Laterza, 2001); Hans Maier, ed., Totalitarismus
und Politische Religionen: Konzepte des Diktaturvergleichs, 3 vols., vol. 3 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2003); Anthony-James
Gregor, Totalitarianism and Political Religion: An Intellectual History (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012).
7Peter Sugar, Nationalism and Religion in the Balkans Since the 19th Century, vol. 8, Treadgold Papers in Russian, East Euro-
pean and Central Asian Studies (Seattle, WA: University of Washington, Jackson School of International Studies, 1996);
Sabrina P. Ramet, Nihil Obstat: Religion, Politics, and Social Change in East-Central Europe and Russia (Durham, NC:
Duke University Press, 1998).
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are developed. In particular, the legacy of Emperor Constantine’s conversion to Chris-
tianity and the celebrations to mark the 1700th anniversary of the Battle of the Milvian
Bridge and the promulgation of the Edict of Milan are examined in the context of the
constant struggles for the recognition of religious antiquity and moral superiority.
Further examples include the way the religious legacies and the constant celebrations
of the Serbian medieval Kingdom, Greek Rum Orthodoxy, and Kosovo medieval
Myth, are used and misused by diﬀerent politico-religious communities throughout
the South-Eastern Europe. This article does not aim, however, to establish the truth
about personalities, facts, or events. I do not aim either to be a part of the heated
debate on the ‘ownership’ of Constantine and the various ethno-political claims to
religious tolerance.
While the relations between religion and politics consume much of political philosophy
and most of the areas specialists, it may be rather more proﬁtable to think anthropologi-
cally of the functions of religion in society, considering both religion and politics as one
and the same thing. Triggered by the ethnic conﬂict in former Yugoslavia, a common
approach to religion assumes its deliberate use in warlike situations where In Hoc Signo
Vinces comes to justify the political purpose of conﬂict.8 In turn, the increasing place
that religion seems to have taken among Southeast European peoples, just as in current
regional and international aﬀairs, might elicit a closer attention to the inherent political
function of religion where In Hoc Signo Vinces comes to signify the politics of inﬂuence
and domination in religious and ecclesiastic disguise.
In this analysis, media events are conceptualized as collective actions in which individ-
uals and groups of people focus their attention on one particular event, by drawing on
certain historical themes and images, which cyclically perform a sense of collective iden-
tity, shared membership and moral beliefs.9 Such a consensual nature of media events
should not underestimate how and why they developed into full-ﬂedged media events
in the ﬁrst place. The narratives may tell us something about the ways in which local
actors imagine their own social worlds, rather than a knowledge about events. Hence,
the distinction between imagination and knowledge is important for understanding the
distortion of representations. It implies a critical assessment of the narratives in newspaper
publications and social media through an analysis of discursive practices and an
investigation of wider social and cultural structures, including the question how such
practices, events and texts are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles
over power.
Constantine the Great
According to the early Church fathers, Lactantius and Eusebius, it is assumed that on 28
October 312 Constantine won the battle that paved him the way to Rome and secured
him Emperor’s throne after a dream showing In Hoc Signo Vinces ‘in this sign you
conquer’, which was the Chi-Rho sign of Christ.10 What is signiﬁcant in this evidence
8Mitja Velikonja, ‘In Hoc Signo Vinces: Religious Symbolism in the Balkan Wars 1991–1995’, International Journal of Politics,
Culture, and Society 17:1 (2003), pp. 25–40.
9Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz, Media Events: The Live Broadcasting of History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992);
Nick Couldry, Andreas Hepp, and Friedrich Krotz, eds., Media Events in a Global Age (London: Routledge, 2010).
10Raymond Van Dam, Remembering Constantine at the Milvian Bridge (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
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of the early Church fathers is the capturing of a myth, which must have been very
important to the growth of early Christianity. The early Christian movement had to
seize Constantine’s growing power and turn his imperial inﬂuence to protect the expan-
sion and consolidation of the early Church authority. In fact, such a process led in Feb-
ruary 313 to the Edict of Milan, in which Constantine granted Christianity with a status
of religio licita within the Roman Empire. Even though Christianity did not yet gain the
status of an oﬃcial religion,11 the Edict of Milan promoted a new religious worldview,
one of religious tolerance and respect towards people with a diﬀerent religious
orientation.12
We may never know for sure what really happened, whether or not Constantine had a
dream and won the battle of the Milvian Bridge under the sign of Christ. However, it is
quite clear that Constantine was ﬁrst and foremost a military commander and for one
thing we can be absolutely sure that he won his battle using the best arms of his time.13
At the same time, we may think that he was also a skilled politician. Ever since 235
AD, rivals for the imperial throne had bid for support by either favoring or persecuting
Christians. To increase his power, Constantine must have also beneﬁted from many inﬂu-
ential opinions of a time when the growing Christianity was no longer persecuted but tol-
erated.14 This must have been especially true in the Roman Southeast European provinces
of which Constantine had a ﬁrst-hand knowledge because of his own origin. Arguably, in
political terms, Constantine must have used the Christian movement for power while
‘maintaining the illusion of divine power’,15 just as the Christians exploited the growing
political power of Constantine to consolidate their religious movement, thus ﬁnding
support mutually to each other. Actually, Constantine tolerated other religions, but he
actively promoted Christianity.16 The importance of this topic in hotly debated among
historians and theologians.17 In all cases, there must have been an unholy alliance
between Constantine and early Christianity, the sole purpose of which was to increase
authority and consolidate power, in the case of the disputed Emperor as in the case of
the persecuted religious movement.
If the story of Constantine’s acceptance of Christianity became important to the growth
of early Christianity as well as to the growth of Constantine’s own power, it also embedded
a narrative of providence within a political act that would later serve as a foundation of
identity politics for contemporary claims to the Balkan peoples being foundational to
Christendom. Such moves are neither neutral nor unilateral. People often repurpose
history and politics to legitimate their view of how the world is and should be, almost
about anything, including religion. Though such forays into history may seem innocent,
often their impact on political and everyday life is not. Apparently, an essential aspect
of religion that ordinary people might have learned from history is that religious move-
ments and political movements have something in common.
11Mark Edwards, Religions of the Constantinian empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
12Martin Wallraﬀ, ed., Religiöse Toleranz: 1700 Jahre nach dem Edikt von Mailand (Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2016).
13Elizabeth James, Constantine the Great: Warlord of Rome (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2012).
14Edward Siecienski, ed., Constantine: Religious Faith and Imperial Policy (London/New York: Routledge, 2017).
15Samuel Slipp, The Quest for Power: Religion and Politics (Charlottesville, VA: Pitchstone, 2010).
16Marta Sordi, I cristiani e l’impero romano (Milano: Jaca Books, 2004).
17Peter Leithart, Defending Constantine: The Twilight of an Empire and the Dawn of Christendom (Downers Grove, IL: IVP
Academic, 2010); John Roth, ed., Constantine Revisited: Leithart, Yoder, and the Constantinian Debate (Eugene, OR: Pick-
wick, 2013); Edward Smither, ed., Rethinking Constantine: History, Theology, and Legacy (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2014).
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The Rum Patriarch
After the fall of Constantinople in 1453, pragmatic political reasons often glossed over in
Islamic religious rewording forced the Ottomans to preserve and even extend the Byzantine
status, authority and competences of the Orthodox Church ruling over the Orthodox com-
munities. One of the ﬁrst things that Mehmed the Conqueror did was to allow the Byzantine
Church to elect a new Patriarch. Clearly, the Ottoman Sultan aimed to assure the loyalty of
the Christian population and above all avoid them appealing to the West for liberation. To
this aim, he approached the most anti-Western scholar he could ﬁnd and in 1454, upon his
order, Georges-Gennadios Scholarios was ﬁrst ordained at a forced and non-canonical pace
to the ranks of deacon, priest, Bishop and then Patriarch of the Orthodox Church without
prior resolution by the Church Holy Synod.18 Similarly, in 1479, Mehmed II created a new
Armenian patriarchal oﬃce in Istanbul appointing Joachim of Bursa as a Patriarch of Istan-
bul, in accordance with Ottoman policies of integrating non-Muslim subjects in the
Ottoman Empire, but in contrast to their practice of sanctioning pre-existing religious
oﬃces and leaders without establishing new ones.19 In this case, as the Armenians had a
spiritual center beyond the borders of the Empire and within the limits of Turkmen factions
that could potentially turn them against Ottoman interests, the Ottomans forced its depor-
tation from sensitive areas to the relative security of Istanbul.
In the Ottoman Empire, ‘millet’ became the technical term used for the organized reli-
gious-political communities recognized by the Sultan and enjoying certain rights of auton-
omy under their own leaders. The organization and composition of the largest and most
important of the non-Muslim millets makes it clear that the former Orthodox Byzantine
Church acquired substantial additional power. Remaining subjects to the Islamic state like
all other non-Muslims, the Orthodox Christians came to be recognized administratively
within the Ottoman Rum Millet, literally from Romioi ‘Romans’ (formerly Orthodox sub-
jects of the Byzantine Empire). By accepting the status oﬀered by the Ottomans, not only it
preserved its Byzantine status and ecclesiastical organization, it also extended its rights and
found ways to play an important role.
The Rum Patriarch became both spiritual leader and administrative ruler, or Ethnarch
(Milletbashi), invested with civil and religious authority over all Orthodox Christians of
the Empire.20 He became part of the Ottoman administration, while the Orthodox
Church was granted privileges based on the political and economic relations between
the Ottoman administration and its Christian subjects. The Ottomans did not interfere
in the internal organization of the Church, but in a stunning 1474 Patriarchal decision
the Church was subjected to a new tax to the Sultan in a profound attempt to pragmati-
cally anchor relations of interdependence.21 In return for its status, the Orthodox Church
also incorporated the public functions of the Ottoman state into its religious pastoral and
administrative practices, thereby securing a ‘natural’ acceptance of its condition by the
Christian subjects of the Ottoman state.
18Marie-Hélène Blanchet, Georges-Gennadios Scholarios (vers 1400-vers 1472): Un intellectuel orthodoxe face à la disparition
de l’Empire byzantin (Paris: Institut français d’études byzantines, 2008).
19Konstantinos Giakoumis, ‘Dialectics of pragmatism in Ottoman domestic interreligious aﬀairs’, Balkan Studies 37 (2013):
81.
20Halil Inalcik, ‘The status of the Greek Orthodox Patriarch under the Ottomans’, Turcica: Revue d’études turques, no. 21–23
(1991).
21Giakoumis, op. cit., pp. 77–78.
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The Rum millet meant the Orthodox Church and all its followers speaking diﬀerent
languages, including Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians, Rumanians, and Albanians. Though
they may have been distinguished ethnically and linguistically, the considerable ethnic-lin-
guistic variation strengthened the basic religious classiﬁcation rather than the ‘racial’,
ethnic or linguistic diﬀerences. Practically, the foundational myth of the Rum millet
oﬃcially sanctioned the ecumenism of the former Byzantine Church, enlarged the juris-
dictional authority of the Rum-aka-Ecumenical Patriarch within the hierarchical structure
of the Eastern Churches, and facilitated the legitimation of Greek-speaking ecclesiastical
elites over all Orthodox Christians in the Balkans.22 During the long centuries of
Ottoman rule, the Rum Church acted as the oﬃcial protector and administrator of the
Rum millet, in which Greek had been the traditional language of church service and
oﬃcial communication. The Orthodox Millet became a basic form of Ottoman social
organization and an indispensable source of identity, which conﬂated Greek ethnic iden-
tity with Rum millet identity. Belonging to this community became increasingly more
important than ethnic origin and most people began to identify themselves simply as
‘Greek’ in the sense of being Orthodox.
At the time of Balkan nationalisms in the nineteenth century, the ideological orien-
tation that emerged in the intellectual and urban class of Ottoman Greek Phanariots
‘tried to combine the nationalistic forces of Hellenism in a passionate if illogical alliance
with the ecumenical traditions of Byzantium and the Orthodox Church’.23 They re-con-
ceptualized the supra-ethnic ‘Eastern Romanity’ of the Rum millet into a new, secular
ethnic identity by considering ‘Greek’ all Orthodox Christians and arguing for the estab-
lishment of a future Greek-Byzantine state, which in their vision should include all Ortho-
dox Christians of the Balkans.24 Hailed as a ‘Great’ (Megali) Idea, this Greek megalomania
was spread in a part of the urban populations of Vlach, Slavic and Albanian origins, who
began to be perceived increasingly as ‘Greek’.
The single-minded oﬃcial dedication to irredentism of the early Greek state may have
been distracted by internal priorities and some reformers disavowed the principle of the
‘Megali-Idea’ altogether as utopian, while feeling that the state should pursue its improve-
ment as an end in itself.25 From 1839, within the framework of the Tanzimat Reformation
that set in motion a process of secularization, the ecumenical ideology of the Rum Church
became closely connected with the argument that the clergy should preserve the pre-
eminent political position it held in the Orthodox millet.26 As a result, on various
occasions the Rum Patriarch may have found himself at loggerheads with the religious
and national priorities of the Greek Megali-Idea.27 The ecumenical ideology remained
nevertheless identiﬁed with models of Patriarchal centralization that attempted to
22Benjamin Braude, ed., Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire, With a New Introduction, Abridged ed. (Boulder, CO:
Lynne-Rienner, 2014).
23Steven Runciman, The Great Church in Captivity: A Study of the Patriarchate of Constantinople from the Eve of the Turkish
Conquest to the Greek War of Independence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), pp. 378–379.
24Victor Roudometof, ‘From Rum Millet to Greek Nation: Enlightenment, Secularization, and National Identity in Ottoman
Balkan Society, 1453–1821’, Journal of Modern Greek Studies 16:1 (1998), pp. 11–48.
25Elli Skopetea, Το Πρότυπο Βασίλειο και η Μεγάλη Ιδέα: Όψεις του εθνικού προβλήματος στην Ελλάδα (1830–1880) [The
Model Kingdom and the Megali Idea: Aspects of the National Question in Greece] (Athens: Polytypo, 1988).
26Dimitris Stamatopoulos, ‘Ecumenical Ideology in the Orthodox Millet (19th–20th Century)’ in Lorans Tanatar-Baruh and
Vangelis Kechriotis (eds) Economy and Society on Both Shores of the Aegean (Athens: Alpha Bank Historical Archives, 2010).
27Thanos Veremis, ‘From the National State to the Stateless Nation 1821–1910’, European History Quarterly 19:2 (1989), pp.
140–144.
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reconnect the imperial perspective with Rum ecumenism, in order to reunite the Orthodox
world of the Ottoman Empire with the Orthodox world of the ‘unredeemed Greeks’.
As early as in the 1830s, the cultivation of Greek national identity and Greek Megali-
Idea became an integral part of the domestic and foreign policy of the newly independent
Greek state. An internal dimension comprised stages and initiatives of nation building
within the independent state of Greece and an external dimension involved the orientation
of the Greek state toward the Greek-inhabited territories of the Ottoman Empire. State
institutions like the Greek military, the educational network of Greek schools, including
the University of Athens, and the nationalized Greek Church took on the task of Grecizing
the diverse ‘other’ Greek Orthodox populations, through the linguistic homogenization of
society both in the Greek state and in the ‘unredeemed territories’.28 Unavoidably, the
dynamic interplay of these processes for the spread of Greek language and the homogen-
ization of Greek culture presupposed a normative discourse of Greek nationalism that
essentially supplied the most eﬀective medium to legitimate both Greek national identity
and Greek irredentism.
The Serbian Kingdom
Another noteworthy example is the two-hundred-years history of the medieval kingdom that
consolidated Serbian tribal groups coming from Asia in their current dwelling places. The
royal legacy provided Serbs their identity and their claims to the lands where they are cur-
rently settled, and this legacy is preserved and transmitted through the Serbian Orthodox
Church, which in itself was nothing but a pure creation of the Serbian dynasty. Between
Serbian and Albanian peoples, there are often ﬁery debates about the religious and ethnic
origin of the founder of the Nemanjici dynasty in the late twelfth century who is said to
have been Catholic and most likely without any substantial connection to other Serbian
tribes. Not surprisingly, to the minds of ordinary people in Serbia, as it can be deduced
from the ﬁerce reaction in the Serbian local daily papers, these allegations quickly meant a
‘scandal of the brutal usurpation of our [Serbian] dynasty’ and another ‘attack on Serbs’.
The claim that the old Serbian dynasty, like the new Karadjordje dynasty of the nineteenth
century, could be of Albanian blood is simply considered ‘nonsense’.29
Nevertheless, after his supposed conversion to Orthodox faith, the founder of the old
Serbian dynasty began the tradition of building churches and monasteries that will play
the most important role in the future for perpetuating the memory of his dynasty and
which have served as outer limits to his holdings and as a means of subjugation of the
local peoples. The resourceful diplomacy of his third son, the monk-cum-politician
Sava, simultaneously reinforced the reign of his brothers and the autonomy of the
Serbian Orthodox Church, by becoming its primate under the Patriarch of Byzantium.
His own sanctiﬁcation like the sanctiﬁcation one after the other of almost all Serbian
rulers from this Church more than anything else served to embed a sacred character to
royal power. As saints, Serbian royal family joined the church liturgy and they were
immortalized in frescoes within the churches and monasteries that they themselves
28Paschalis Kitromilides, ‘Imagined Communities and the Origins of the National Question in the Balkans’, European History
Quarterly 19:2 (1989), pp. 162–165.
29‘Napad na Srpstvo: Nemanjići i Karađorđe su poreklom Albanci!’ Kurir, 29.03.2014, http://www.kurir.rs/napad-na-srpstvo-
nemanjici-i-karadorde-su-poreklom-albanci-clanak-1298687.
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built in Serbia and Kosovo. These frescoes clearly show their ambition for power directly
sanctioned by God’s will, a kind of power replica that could only be compared with the
Byzantine imperial greatness. In fact, in the Easter Sunday of 1346, the most powerful
king Dushan was self-crowned ‘Emperor’ (Tsar) of the Serbs, Greeks, Albanians and Bul-
garians. This ‘Emperor’ did not restrain from strangling his own father in 1331 to take the
throne. He is also said to have triggered the Byzantine intrigues and rivalries that paved the
way to the ﬁrst penetration of the Ottomans in the Balkans. But given that only the Patri-
arch of Byzantium could crown an ‘Emperor’, without the least dilemma he created his
own Patriarch, thus establishing the Patriarchate of the Serbian Orthodox Church,
wholly independent from and of equal rights with the Greek-Byzantine Patriarchate.30
In this way, much the same as Henry VIII established the Church of England, the inde-
pendent Serbian Orthodox Church was created absolutely to sanction and perpetuate
the legacy of a political power under which it could only exist.
Any ordinary Albanian, especially in Kosovo, will be quick to remember another
similar myth that is used similarly to celebrate similar stories. Namely, on 28 June
1989, Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic used the 600th anniversary commemoration
of the Kosovo Battle of 1389 to strengthen his power by exploiting the myth of the battle,31
probably not unlike Constantine once did with Christianity or the Nemanjici with their
own Church. The narrative of a Christian loss, despite both sides suﬀering heavy losses,
is reinterpreted by Serbian nationalist politics, from the nineteenth century until today,
as the emblematic Christian Serbian sacriﬁce at the hands of Muslim Ottoman armies.
Gatherings to commemorate this myth served exactly the politics of setting, validating
and justifying the boundaries of Serbian holdings at the expense of other populations,
as well as any means needed to enforce them.
Ethnic conﬂicts in former Yugoslavia
Far from being a Balkan peculiarity, the use and misuse of religious symbolism and
mythological rhetoric during the ethnic conﬂicts of 1990s in former Yugoslavia is a
very speciﬁc version and regional manifestation of a much broader process, in which reli-
gions have always been used and abused for political ends, even in the most advanced
liberal democratic countries. Apparently, the mixing of religion and politics is the most
enduring mean to the legitimation of power. In the speciﬁc context of former Yugoslavia,
religious activists and oﬃcials engaged in a battle for the de-secularization of society. Pol-
itical developments in the late 1980s provided them an excellent opportunity for the long-
awaited re-Christianization and re-Islamization of the political and cultural identity of
‘their’ nations, in an eﬀort to reconquer the social space that was denied to them by the
previous atheist regime.32 The radicalization of religious fundamentalism rapidly
became an important part of the dominant strategy in close alliance with identity politics.
This total alliance between nationalist policies and religious institutions was of mutual
beneﬁt and religious legitimation became an important part of the process of the ethnici-
zation of politics and the politicization of ethnicity.
30Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997).
31Jason Edwards, ‘Bringing in Earthly Redemption: Slobodan Milosevic and the National Myth of Kosovo’, Advances in the
History of Rhetoric 18:sup1 (2015).
32Velikonja, op. cit.
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Although the role and inﬂuence of religious hierarchies before and during the wars
in former Yugoslavia were quite diﬀerent, all the warring parties employed religious sym-
bolism in their political mobilization and military eﬀorts. Opinions about the nationalist
and militaristic role of religious institutions in former Yugoslavia from the late 1980s
diﬀer considerably from author to author. The Roman Catholic Church in Croatia has
received a considerable amount of criticism, both in Croatia and overseas, for its connec-
tion with the conservative nationalism of the political regime.33 The role of the Bosnian
Islamic community was also very active in securing political allegiance and nationalist
mobilization.34 Often controversial Muslim protagonists of the war were aﬀorded
similar religious backing as their Christian counterparts. For some Islamic believers,
Izetbegovic became a ‘ﬁghter for Islam’, sent by God ‘to lead the Muslims along the
true path’, or the ﬁrst person after Muhammad to reveal and fulﬁll ‘the ultimate truth’,
and even Saudi King Fahd awarded him with a medal for ‘his contribution to the
spread of Islam’.35
The majority of commentators claim that the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church was
more important and ‘the most harmful’.36 At the very beginning of 1980s, empirical evi-
dence could not have proved that Orthodoxy was coming back to the social scene in the
local religious areas in former Yugoslavia. However, it was in this period that Orthodoxy
emerged from several decades of isolation in the margins of social and political life,
especially after the events in Kosovo, which was to become the central social and political
issue in former Yugoslavia and today Serbia. During this time, with a general politicization
of culture in former Yugoslavia, Orthodoxy was also politicized as one of the most eﬃcient
spiritual resources of national homogenization and political mobilization for the conﬂicts
to come. The collapse of socialism and the ethnic conﬂicts served as the most general social
setting in which Orthodoxy was to regain its cultural domination and institutionalized sig-
niﬁcance and inﬂuence it used to have.
Serbian sociologists of religion proudly claim that there could have been no revival of
Serbian national identity and the Serbian state without the revival of Orthodoxy. They
cannot even refrain themselves from being proud of the Serbian Orthodox Church as
‘not only a religious institution, but a national one as well, and probably the only insti-
tution that had never betrayed Serbian people throughout history’.37 Actually in Bosnia,
the Serbian Orthodox Church became a servant of religious nationalist militancy,38 and
remained loyal to Greater Serbian politics and ambitions. It is not accidental that the
Greek Orthodox Church also sided publicly with the Serbian side.39 Public support for
the Serbian Orthodox brethren has been consistent with popular geopolitical thinking
in Greece whereby the goal of forming a Balkan-wide Orthodox alliance against
Muslim threats was widely circulated and discussed.40 To this aim, the Serbian Orthodox
33Alex Bellamy, ‘The Catholic Church and Croatia’s Two Transitions’, Religion, State & Society 30:1 (2002).
34Xavier Bougarel, Survivre aux empires: islam, identité nationale et allégeances politiques en Bosnie-Herzégovine (Paris:
Karthala, 2015).
35Velikonja, op. cit., p. 31.
36Paul Mojzes, ed. Religion and the war in Bosnia (Atlanta, Ga.: Scholars Press, 1998), 84.
37Mirko Blagojevic, ‘Desecularization of Contemporary Serbian Society’, Religion in Eastern Europe 28:1 (2008): 42.
38Michael Sells, The bridge betrayed: religion and genocide in Bosnia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 79.
39Takis Michas, Unholy alliance: Greece and Milosevic’s Serbia (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002).
40Victor Roudometof, ‘Eastern Orthodox Christianity and the uses of the past in contemporary Greece’, Religions: Open
Access Journal of Theology 2:2 (2011): 106.
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Church did not refrain to glorify and sanctify the ethno-homicidal criminals who best
served Serbian identity politics.41 Political and military leaders and war criminals like Kar-
adzic and Mladic or Arkan received a ﬂattering religious reputation. They described them-
selves as the defenders of ‘our tribe and our Church’,42 and high-ranking Serbian and
Greek Orthodox dignitaries declared them ‘the most prominent sons of our Lord Jesus
Christ working for peace’.43
Politicking over great legacies
The courtesies, exaltations, consecrations and celebrations point to the mutually reinfor-
cing and locally contextualized nature of the politics of religion, and the ease with which
nationalist tropes emerge as ordained and legitimate, while incursions into history hold
political clout to the extent they make the present seem purposeful. Histories are not
without bias and questions about the primacy of diﬀerent Churches and cultural heritages
are often answered with political ends in mind.
In April 2012, not without reason the Vatican organized a ﬁrst world congress on ‘Con-
stantine the Great and the Roots of Europe’ to mark the 1, 700th anniversary of the Battle
of the Milvian Bridge, followed by a second congress held in Milan in 2013 for the 1, 700th
anniversary of the promulgation of the Edict of Milan.44 In October 2013, the Serbian
Orthodox Church organized in Nish, the birthplace of Constantine, an even larger
world conference and exhibition.45 Serbs can also look to the churches and monasteries
built by the Nemanjici dynasty to claim a territorial holding,46 just as they look to the
Kosovo myth to speak of a Christian sacriﬁce in the past,47 and construct the Muslim
other in the present.48 Similarly, Albanians look to the eﬀorts of the Greek Orthodox
Church in obliterating the use of Albanian language as an example of systematic oppres-
sion. The political functions of religion represent both the imagined and the real state of
everyday life, while the celebrations strongly recall the unholy alliance between religion
and politics, which in each case enable and reinforce each other.
A series of international conferences are organized annually in Kosovo, to which I also
participated, respectively in Prishtina (May 2012), Peja (May 2013) and Prizren (May
2014), where religious beliefs and interfaith dialogue are extensively debated as a tool
for democratic development at the international level. Notably, the ﬁrst conference was
organized by the American University in Prishtina to commemorate the 1, 700th anniver-
sary of the Battle of the Milvian Bridge and the legacy of Emperor Constantine’s conver-
sion to Christianity. In my presentation, I asked why such a conference was organized in
41Florian Bieber, ‘Nationalist mobilization and stories of Serb suﬀering: The Kosovo myth from 600th anniversary to the
present’, Rethinking History 6:1 (2002).
42Mojzes, Religion and the war in Bosnia, 89.
43Sells, The bridge betrayed: religion and genocide in Bosnia, 85.
44‘Academics in Rome to Mark Anniversary of Constantine’s Conversion’, Zenit, 17.04.2012, https://zenit.org/articles/
academics-in-rome-to-mark-anniversary-of-constantine-s-conversion/.
45Dragisha Bojovic, ed. Sveti Car Konstantin i Hrišćanstvo: Međunarodni naućni skuo povodom 1700. godišnjice Milanskog
edikta (31 maj - 2 jun 2013), 2 vols. vols. (Nish: Centre of Church Studies, 2013); Ivana Popovic and Bojana Boric-Breshkovic,
Constantine the Great and the Edict of Milan 313: the birth of Christianity in the Roman provinces on the soil of Serbia (Bel-
grade: National Museum in Belgrade, 2013).
46Judah, op. cit.
47Branimir Anzulovic, Heavenly Serbia: From Myth to Genocide (New York: New York University Press, 1999).
48Milica Bakic-Hayden, ‘National Memory as Narrative Memory: The Case of Kosovo’ in Maria Todorova (ed) Balkan Identities:
Nation and Memory (New York: New York University Press, 2004), pp. 25–40.
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Kosovo.49 Of course, Constantine was of Balkan origin and Dardanian descent, being born
in Nish, located within the Illyrian province of Dardania, which corresponds approxi-
mately to present-day Kosovo. In fact, this reason was stated very clearly during the con-
ference. Similar events were also organized the following year in Tirana, in Prishtina, and
even in remote localities in Kosovo,50 receiving great acclaim in Albanian and Kosovar
local media and public opinion.51 These celebrations forward political agendas and
claims of identity politics hoping to ﬁnd legitimacy in religious history. Among other
things, they claim to prove Kosovo and the Albanians as a land and a people of religious
tolerance, since Constantine’s story is ultimately a story of religious tolerance. These are
not merely neutral characterizations of the past, but rather political claims to the moral
superiority of one group over another, competing claims made by all, whether Albanians,
Serbs, Greeks, or Macedonians.
In April 2013, a Symposium titled ‘Constantine: 1700th Anniversary of the Edict ofMilan
and the Religious Freedom’ was also organized in Tirana at the initiative of the Catholic
Church with the support of major Albanian research institutions. In his address, the
Albanian Prime Minister Sali Berisha acclaimed of Constantine the Great: ‘Illyrian in
origin, Dardanian in descent, in this anniversary, he makes every Albanian proud’.52
In September 2013, another three-day Symposium on Constantine and the Edict of Milan
was organized in Prishtina, again at the initiative of the Catholic Church in Kosovo with
the support of Kosovo major research institutions. The explicit aim was to show that ‘the
historical legacy of Constantine the Great and the Edict ofMilan are relevant to the historical
memory of Kosovo and its European identity’. In his address, Kosovo ForeignMinister Enver
Hoxhaj emphasized that Constantine the Great was a native of the Illyrian Dardania: ‘Given
the Western scientiﬁc line of thinking about our Illyrian origin, as one of the oldest nations
in Europe, Constantine the Great is part of the historical consciousness of the citizens of
Kosovo and the Albanians wherever they live’. He is ‘the symbol of our European roots’
and his legacy ‘is very precious for our Illyrian-Albanian world’.53
During the conference lunch in May 2012, the Serbian translator who was from Nish,
the birthplace of Constantine in present-day Serbia, told me that people in Nish know
where the Palace of Constantine is located and some want to dig it out to build a monu-
ment, but they have not yet the necessary funding. It could be argued that today’s Serbs in
Nish have nothing to do with Constantine, as he was an Illyrian and in Illyrian Dardania
there were not yet any Slavic people. Surely, in terms of identity, the people of Constan-
tine’s era are not today’s people. Yet, nothing prevents Serbs or Albanians from trying to
recover a glorious past that connects them to times and ﬁgures of greatness like
Constantine. Surely, there is no need to deal here with the ‘right’ of Albanians to consider
themselves the descendants of the Constantine’s Illyrian fellow countrymen, even though
49‘The politics of religion and the construction of instrumental realities and identities against an imagined future of the
Balkans’, Faiths in Kosovo: Past, Present, Future, International Conference Commemorating the 1700th anniversary of
the Battle of the Milvian Bridge and the Conversion of Emperor Constantine to Christianity, American University in
Kosovo, Prishtina, 15–17 May 2012, http://youtu.be/APpTBﬀsjfc.
50‘Konstandini Ilir, Edikti i Milanos dhe Shqiptarët’, 21.09.2013, https://www.facebook.com/katedralja.org/photos/a.
10150139439732494.331320.59216752493/10151957634782494/.
51‘Teksti Origjinal i Ediktit te Milanos (Latinisht e Shqip)’, 19.02.2013, https://www.facebook.com/katedralja.org/photos/a.
10150139439732494.331320.59216752493/10151541268837494/.
52Konstandini: 1700 vjetori i Ediktit të Milanos dhe Liria fetare, Tirana: Albanian Episcopal Conference, 2014, p. 29.
53Press Releases & Media, ‘Symposium: Edict of Milan – Constantine the Great, 2013’, http://www.interfaithkosovo.org/
constantine-the-great-edict-of-milan-symposium/.
POLITICS, RELIGION & IDEOLOGY 457
this ‘right’ cannot reasonably be with the Serbs. Still, everyday talk among ordinary
Albanians, written press, social media, and blogging is constantly full of that. Likewise,
Serbian ﬁction is instrumental to this aim. Dejan Stojiljkovic’s novel Kostandinovo raskršće
‘Constantine’s crossing’ (2009), about the quest of Constantine’s sword in Nish, remains
one of the most widely read books in Serbian public libraries.54 Even scientiﬁc events of
electrochemistry become a good opportunity to remind others of Constantine’s greatness
in Serbian land.55
What is more, for whatever reason the Serbs advance their claims to Constantine, this
will annoy the Greeks, because of their own claims of an elective aﬃnity with Constantine
and his alleged Christian Orthodox legacy. During the Prishtina conference, the Greek
Envoy to Kosovo noted very well such a connection that according to him is indisputable.
The recent dispute between Greece and North Macedonia over the very ownership of the
name of ‘Macedonia’ has strikingly illustrated that conﬂicts arising around the possession
of symbols, rituals and ‘true’ names may occur in the so-called ‘modern’ Europe, similarly
to what is well documented for the once-called ‘primitive’ Melanesia.56 This may really
seem like another ﬁght over intangible properties of names, personalities, events, or lega-
cies, but we know very well how it happens and what is going on still over another
‘Greater’ than Constantine between Greece and North Macedonia. Both seem to have
good reason to ﬁght with each other for their own Alexander the Great. Why not for Con-
stantine the Great? This suggests that seeing Constantine as someone native of the region
and ﬁghting for his belonging is not only naïve, but also politically dangerous.
The paradox of religious tolerance
The celebration of Constantine and the Edict of Milan was also marked in North Mace-
donia. The reconstruction of St. Constantine and Helen Church was consecrated at its sup-
posed original location on the Macedonia Square in the Center of Skopje, but also in other
North Macedonian towns. In May 2013, a World Conference was organized in Skopje on
issues of Freedom and Dignity as basic values in interpersonal, interreligious and intercul-
tural relations. In September 2013, a formal meeting and a holy liturgy took also place at
the St. Sophia Church in Ohrid. However, the current disputes and discord with the
Serbian Orthodox Church that does not recognize the Macedonian Orthodox Church
could not fail to aﬀect the celebration of the Edict of Milan in North Macedonia.57 In
his Easter address, the Macedonian Archbishop highlighted explicitly the main message
of the Edict of Milan in the context of the Macedonian Orthodox Church. ‘This is an
event that should unify all Christians, and be our encouragement and reminder for
strengthening and developing unity as well as overcoming our diﬀerences and misunder-
standings that still exist among Christ’s followers’.58 Blatantly, the representatives of the
54http://www.konstantinovoraskrsce.com/.
55Second Regional Symposium on Electrochemistry: South-East Europe Program & Book of Abstracts, Belgrade, 06-10/06/2010,
p. 32, http://www.shd.org.rs/RSE-SEE_2/RSE_SEE_2-Book_of_Abstracts.pdf.
56Simon Harrison, Stealing People’s Names: History and Politics in a Sepik River Cosmology (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1990).
57Gjoko Gjorgjevski, ‘Macedonian Orthodox Church in the Context of Balkan and European Orthodoxy’, Occasional Papers on
Religion in Eastern Europe 37:4 (2017), pp. 1–16.
58Ruzhica Cacanoska and Maja Angelovska, ‘The Edict of Milan Through the Prism of Students at the Faculty of Orthodox
Theology in Macedonia’, Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe 34:1 (2014), p. 4.
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Macedonian Church were not invited at the celebrations in Serbia, but Church dignitaries
in North Macedonia pointed out that they, as an Orthodox Church, ‘shall celebrate the
jubilee appropriately’.
A sociological research on opinions and interpretations among students at the Univer-
sity of Skopje Faculty of Orthodox Theology on these issues showed that they also com-
mented on the relation between religion and politicking, while they mentioned a number
of ‘weak spots’ in the current actions of Orthodox religious institutions in the Balkans.
North Macedonian students of Orthodox theology followed these media events both in
print media and in social networks in North Macedonia as in other Southeast European
countries.59 Some of them talked about their ‘zealous’ online discussion with people
from neighboring countries. Others sent their extensive email discussion with ‘colleagues
and fellow-believers’ from Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia and Greece, in which the ‘estab-
lished positions’ were highlighted, as well as the ‘awareness of the need for additional
studying of the historical data basis with a particular emphasis on the Edict as an act of
tolerance’. Yet others pointed out that even though they start from similar historical
basis, the problem is that they interpret them diﬀerently.
All agree on the great symbolical inﬂuence that the Edict of Milan continues to have on
Christianity, but often there are no ‘actions’ conform to such symbolism. To their opinion,
it is very important ‘to refer back to the Edict of Milan, not just as a historical document
but as an act that provided Christianity with new attire, stirred its development into a new
direction and gave it great power’. The Edict of Milan must have brought ‘drastic changes’,
most of which were good, especially before Christianity was declared a state religion and
when the believers distinguished themselves with ‘dedication and love’. However, after
Christianity became a state religion, the ‘passion for it’ declined and ‘people are no
longer ready to give their lives for it’. Instead, ‘various divisions and hidden goals take
its meaning to diﬀerent directions, and one just needs to read the statements and com-
ments of many church dignitaries from the Balkans to notice what is happening now
with the Edict of Milan’. Many current events in Christian Orthodoxy ‘are a result of a
great deal of irresponsibility of the religious leaders’. Some may even believe that ‘the sig-
niﬁcance of this document increasingly fades away in respect to current events, and some-
times it is not the best answer to refer back to it and to glorify it’, especially when people
are now ‘trying to use religion to secure for themselves a better position in society’.60
More blatantly, after the inauguration of the Resurrection Cathedral in Tirana in June
2014, where the Serbian ﬂag was also brieﬂy but aggressively displayed,61 the Patriarch of
the Serbian Orthodox Church stated for a national TV channel in Albania that ‘Kosovo is
the sacred land of Serbia’.62 In Albanian public opinions, this was characterized as a ‘brutal
and unscrupulous provocation’,63 which claimed at showing a kind of politics, in this case
59ibid.
60quoted in ibid., 11–13.
61‘Shenjtërimi i Katedrales Ngjallja e Krishtit shoqërohet me incidente’, Dita, 01.06.2014, http://www.gazetadita.al/
shenjterimi-i-kishes-ngjallja-e-krishtit-ne-ceremoni-kreret-e-ortodoksise-boterore/; ‘Shpaloset ﬂamuri serb para Kate-
drales ortodokse n’midis Tirane’, Presheva Jonë, 01.06.2014, http://www.preshevajone.com/shteti-shqiptar-ne-rrezik-
shpaloset-ﬂamuri-serb-para-katedrales-ortodokse-nmidis-tirane/.
62‘Irinej: Kosova, e shenjtë për Serbinë’, Top Channel TV, 01 June 2014, http://top-channel.tv/lajme/artikull.php?id=278998,
https://youtu.be/mF48Id7PxCw.
63‘Tirana dhe Prishtina në këmbë kundër kryepeshkopit serb, Berisha e shpall armik, Rama e sulmon ashpër, tension në
Kosovë’, Gazeta Express, 03.06.2014, http://www.gazetaexpress.com/lajme/tirana-dhe-prishtina-ne-kembe-kunder-
kryepeshkopit-serb-berisha-e-shpall-armik-rama-e-sulmon-ashper-tension-ne-kosove-18533/.
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a nationalist politics, in blatant support to the territorial and political interests of Serbia
over the state of Kosovo. The Albanian Prime Minister was outraged and oﬀended and
at his meeting with the primates of World Orthodoxy, he demonstrably pointed his
ﬁnger to the Serbian Patriarch: ‘Your colleague abused our hospitality, he derogated our
religious celebration day and he changed the evidence of our religious coexistence into
an outdated politicking issue’.64
Among Albanians, it is not unusual that Muslims and Christians celebrate each other’s
religious festivals.65 This reﬂects a long tradition of religious coexistence in a country
where even members of the same family may follow diﬀerent faiths.66 In September
2014, Pope Francis described religious tolerance in Albania as ‘a precious treasure’ to pre-
serve, while he held a Sunday mass in front of 300.000 people, many of themMuslims.67 In
January 2015, senior clerics from the four Albanian main faiths – Sunni Muslim, Bektashi
Muslim, Orthodox Christian and Catholic Christian – walked arm in arm at the memorial
march in Paris after the attacks on Charlie Hebdo.68
However, the long Albanian tradition of religious coexistence faces a challenge from the
rise of an intolerant strain of Islam among a minority of Albanians, which has even
resulted in some jihadist seedbeds. So far, the tensions raised by radicalization have
been conﬁned to vitriolic online debates, with some condemning any display of Muslim
identity and others accusing them of not understanding the Islamic faith.69 Similarly,
there is a clear note of criticism in the interpretation of the Edict of Milan by the North
Macedonian students of Orthodox theology who see it ﬁrst and foremost through the
prism of contemporary religious living that throughout history has been pervaded by
‘intolerance’ and numerous conﬂicts and divisions in the Balkans. Not inviting represen-
tatives of the Macedonian Orthodox Church to the celebration in Serbia ‘is a direct lack of
understanding of what we believe Constantine did, while here you have a politicization of
the dispute’.70
In everyday discussions among Albanians, religious tolerance is also only theoretical
and may seem quite far from practical life. For some, ‘we are normal people until there
are no religious people, but at the moment the religious-minded come, the normal disap-
pear, especially when they point to whom they call the heathen’. For others, any forced
conviction turns into a criminal action. ‘If through the violent denial of religions the Com-
munists replaced people’s fear of the Lord with the fear of the Dictator, there is a reason to
consider atheism as a criminal communist belief following Enver Hoxha’s criminal
madness’. Yet others are convinced there are hundreds of thousands of people who
64‘Rama kritikon patriarkun serb: Shpërﬁlle besimin, na ke fyer!’, A1Report-Shqiptarja, 02.06.2014, http://shqiptarja.com/
news.php?IDNotizia=217677&NomeCategoria=home&Titolo=rama-kritikon-patriarkun-serb-shp-rﬁlle-besimin-na-ke-
fyer&IDCategoria=1&reply=384881&page=1.
65Ger Duijzings, Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo (London: Hurst, 2000).
66Giovanni Cimbalo, Pluralismo confessionale e comunità religiose in Albania (Bologna: Bononia University Press, 2012).
67‘Papa Françesku në Shqipëri’, 21.09.2014, http://www.oranews.tv/vendi/papa-francesku-miresevjen-ne-shqiperi-ora-
news-ndjek-live-viziten-historike/.
68‘Marshimi, harmonia fetare çudit Parisin, duartrokiten 4 klerikët shqiptarë’, Shqiptarja, 11/01/2015, http://shqiptarja.com/
aktualitet/2731/marshimi-harmonia-fetare-cudit--parisin-duartrokiten-4-kleriket-shqiptare-265002.html#sthash.
b961LdaY.dpuf.
69Albert Doja, ’Religionspolitischer Alltag im Südosteuropa’, RGOW: Religion & Gesellschaft in Ost und West 45:2 (2017), pp.
24–27. Similar debates regarding a certain apology of Islam also plague public opinions in Western Europe. See: Albert
Doja, ‘Débat: Pourquoi certains penseurs de l’islam font fausse route’, The Conversation, 18 March 2019, https://
theconversation.com/debat-pourquoi-certains-penseurs-de-lislam-font-fausse-route-111352.
70Cacanoska and Angelovska, op. cit., p. 14.
460 A. DOJA
abuse falsely as ‘pious believers of God’. They follow religious rituals, worship God and
confess their sins before a priest, thinking they wash themselves before God, whereas
just out of the church or the mosque, they do not only commit minor sins of human
nature, but criminal and barbaric murder or incitement to bloody conﬂicts causing
numerous victims’.71
Religion as a cultural and political system
The philosophical and anthropological problems raised by the various ways in which reli-
gion and politics may intersect, as I explore in more detail elswhere,72 have been important
in previous eras, especially the early modern era, even though some discussions have been
more pressing for contemporary political thought. The topic of establishment of a church
versus its complete separation from state has been central to political thought in the West
since at least the days of Constantine. The Latin concept of tolerantia was also a highly
developed political and judicial concept in medieval scholastic theology and canon law,
used to ‘denote the self-restraint of a civil power’ in the face of heretics, Jews, Muslims,
and other social groups like lepers, witches, or prostitutes,73 even though toleration ‘as
a government-sanctioned practice’ is not attested before the sixteenth century.74 In the
wake of the Enlightenment and the Protestant Reformation, European societies wrestled
with determining what roles church and state should play in each other’s sphere, while
humanist thinkers were formulating legal codes and theories of religious toleration in
order to limit both government and church coercive actions.
A distinction developed between civil tolerance, concerned with the policy of the
state towards religious dissent, and ecclesiastical tolerance, concerned with the
degree of diversity tolerated within a particular church.75 In modern parlance, tolera-
tion is analyzed as a liberal view of human rights, which for a long time has been the
most prevalent argument of liberal philosophers, who conceive of toleration as a prag-
matic response or what Rawls calls ‘overlapping consensus’ to the fact of diverse meta-
physical views and comprehensive schemes of practice.76 The new liberalism seems to
imply that it is wrong for government to discriminate in favor of or against any form
of society animated by a deﬁnite conception of the good. Although there are many
reasons to be tolerant, traditional discussions have emphasized the respect for auton-
omy, pedagogical concerns, a general commitment to paciﬁsm, and other values that
are thought to be good for human ﬂourishing, including a sense of self-conscious phi-
losophical modesty about one’s ability to judge the beliefs and actions of others.77 A
further concern for racial equality, gender neutrality, an end of prejudice, respect
for cultural and ethnic diﬀerence, and a general commitment to multiculturalism
71‘Toleranca në provë: Shqipëria përballë sﬁdës së radikalizmit’, Mapo, 10.12.2015, http://www.mapo.al/2015/12/toleranca-
ne-prove-shqiperia-perballe-sﬁdes-se-radikalizmit.
72Albert Doja, ’The Unholy Ethics of Religious Politics: A Contrastive Account from Political Philosophy and Political Anthro-
pology’, Journal of Beliefs & Values, Forthcoming: under review (2020).
73Alexandra Walsham, Charitable Hatred: Tolerance and Intolerance in England, 1500–1700 (Manchester: Manchester Univer-
sity Press, 2006), p. 234.
74H.A. Drake, ‘Lambs into Lions: Explaining Early Christian Intolerance’, Past & Present 153:1 (1996), pp. 3–36.
75John Coﬀey, Persecution and Toleration in Protestant England, 1558–1689 (London: Routledge, 2013), pp. 11–12.
76Rawls, op. cit.
77Andrew Fiala, ‘Toleration’, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://www.iep.utm.edu/tolerati/.
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have fueled ongoing debates about the nature of toleration in the age of globalization
and homogenization.78
In itself, however, the notion of toleration implies a certain disrespect as it is directed
toward something perceived as negative. It is often about absurd beliefs and foolish acts,
which we have the power to negate as undesirable, false or at least inferior, but we delib-
erately refrain from negation and we tolerate them even though we know them to be
absurd and foolish.79 Philosophical discussions on the paradox of tolerance also show
that most minority religious groups who are the beneﬁciaries of tolerance are often intol-
erant, at least in some respects,80 while ‘pure tolerance’ that permits all may promote tota-
litarianism and the tyranny of a majority, or its ideal of state neutrality may turn into
another hegemonic ideology.81 Today there are strains of conservatism that argue for
the establishment of church and what Marcuse called a ‘repressive tolerance’ by empha-
sizing the ethical beneﬁts of a substantial social cohesion, especially with respect to adher-
ence to certain values that are claimed to accrue to the political system or society at large.82
The eﬀects of democracy that ground political authority in the rational consent of the
people rather than in divine authorization, together with religious criticism and secular-
ism, have not yet resulted in the disappearance or privatization of religion from public
life and political culture. The same can be said for the general commitment to religious
diversity, the demands of justice and the pursuit of the common good that include prin-
ciples of toleration. The relation between religion and politics continues to be an impor-
tant theme in political philosophy, despite the emergent consensus both among political
theorists and in practical political contexts on the right to freedom of conscience and
on some sort of separation between church and state. This also implies the need for
society to be unwilling to tolerate unjustiﬁed religious beliefs about morality, spirituality
and politics, especially beliefs that promote violence.
Inadvertently, ongoing philosophical debates between new liberalism and conservatism
on the politics of religion and religious tolerance seem to come dangerously close to theo-
logical apologetics considering that we have religion because religion is true and that we
are the kind of beings that can see and receive the truth. People may also believe their reli-
gion is a moral good and that they are the sort of people who appreciate and promote it.
Albanians also seem to believe they are tolerant because tolerance is the best of the
common good.83 Whatever these assertions might mean, they could hardly satisfy
social scientists and anthropologists. Not only because they may not share theologians’
views and people’s beliefs, or because the purpose of a social scientiﬁc approach cannot
be the apologetics of religion, even not that of religious tolerance. More simply, the ethno-
graphic experience shows that diﬀerent people in diﬀerent times and places have seen,
have received and have appreciated many of such truths and goods that are very
diﬀerent from one another.
78Will Kymlicka,Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2007).
79Isaiah Berlin, Liberty, Incorporating Four Essays on Liberty, ed. Henry Hardy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
80Michael Walzer, On toleration (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997), pp. 80–81.
81Herbert Marcuse, ‘Repressive Tolerance’ in A Critique of Pure Tolerance (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), pp. 81–123.
82Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Roger
Scruton, The Meaning of Conservatism, Rev. 3rd ed. (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2002).
83Albert Doja, ’The Everyday of Religion and Politics in the Balkans’ in David Montgomery (ed) Everyday Life in the
Balkans (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2019), pp. 321–336. doi:10.2307/j.ctv80cbk7.36.
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Since all truths and goods are relative, we ought to be tolerant of those who hold
diﬀerent points of view or we ought to know the truth and the good in their speciﬁc cul-
tural and social situations. From an anthropological perspective, when we think and talk
about religion and tolerance, we are dealing with some very diﬀerent things that must not
get confused. First, we have to do with the truth of God, which we can believe that it is as
we are told or we may leave it in its own sanctity. Second, when we talk about religion, we
are dealing above all with religious oﬃcials and religious institutions that are like poli-
ticians and patrons of power and authority. In Albania, they are those who oﬃciate in
Greek or in Arabic, even though the politics of religion can be felt more profoundly at
the level of everyday interactions. When we talk about religion and religious tolerance,
only a few are believers, and not all of them are necessarily tolerant or intolerant,
which is not their fault, and ‘Lord shall forgive them, for they do not know what they
do!’ Finally, when we think and talk about religion and religious tolerance, we are
dealing with the large mass of ordinary people. In most cases, the deﬁnition of their reli-
gious aﬃliation and identity is a political issue for the entrepreneurs of social groups,
ethnic minorities or religious communities where any individual is taken to belong.
The various ways in which the social and cultural functions of religion are distributed
and accomplished in society show that religion plays always an important political role.
Religion does not only ﬁll individual psychological and emotional needs, provide expla-
nations of the origins of cultural institutions, and soothe immediate problems. It is also
the source of rules, norms, and ultimate sanctions, either ﬁlling needs of social cohesion
and perpetuation or providing motivations of rebellion and social transformation. As I
explored in more detail elsewhere,84 religion shows human beings as builder of symbolic
worlds whose function is to serve as a political balance to the rest of social life. One reason
for the importance of this topic in both political philosophy and political anthropology is
that religions often make strong claims on people’s allegiance. Simply put, to get the belief
and authority granted in faith, religious leaders need followers who believe in the holy
word, just as to get the power granted in politics, politicians need voters who believe in
the promised policy. From this standpoint, as I showed more speciﬁcally in the case of
Bektashism,85 the political readjustment of religion may show how the transfer from
the religious to the political domain points to an ideological dimension that might be
hidden behind categorical discourses and authoritative doctrines.
The deeply political signiﬁcance of religion becomes even more apparent when looking
at the extent to which contemporary societies are at an important crossroad that requires
making bold choices. Whether in West or in Southeast Europe, they are faced with an
increasing competition between diﬀerent religions to obtain people’s souls. The Albanians,
whether in Albania or in Kosovo, are undergoing radical transformations in almost every
area, every aspect, and every detail, even though in the ﬁrst place this tells more about the
dynamic vitality of transformations than about the outcomes. At the same time, social life
both in Albania and in Kosovo is experiencing radical destruction in almost any ﬁeld,
84Albert Doja, ’Histoire et dialectique des idéologies et signiﬁcations religieuses’, The European Legacy: Towards New Para-
digms 5:5 (2000), pp. 663–686. doi:10.1080/713665519.
85Albert Doja, ’A political history of Bektashism from Ottoman Anatolia to Contemporary Turkey’, Journal of Church and
State 48:2 (2006), pp. 421–450, doi:10.1093/jcs/48.2.423; Albert Doja, ’A Political History of Bektashism in Albania’, Tota-
litarian Movements and Political Religions [Politics, Religion & Ideology] 7:1 (2006), pp. 83–107, doi:10.1080/
14690760500477919: Albert Doja, ’Spiritual Surrender: From Companionship to Hierarchy in the History of Bektashism’,
Numen: International Review for the History of Religions 53:2 (2006), pp. 448–510. doi:10.1163/156852706778941996.
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especially in terms of social and moral values. All this dynamic transformation and
destruction is clearly reﬂected everywhere, including religious belongings and traditional
aﬃliations. Diﬀerent religious traditions challenge coexistence and tolerance in everyday
life, while traditional aﬃliations of religious belongings are constantly challenged by
open proselytizing policies that are eagerly taken over by religious organizations of any
kind.
The concept of religious identity cannot be taken uncritically to imply a self-explana-
tory religious belonging. One cannot simply accept that Orthodox Albanians, for instance,
are Greek because of the claim that they practice a Greek-Byzantine rite, just as one cannot
accept that they are Muslims because of the claim that a majority are said to belong to
Islam, nor they are Muslims or Christians because they may say ‘I am Muslim’ or ‘I am
Christian’. The prominence of religious belonging is evident when a religious label is
attached and when religious identity is emphasized by the very act of religious belonging.
Only then cultural behavior and religious practices and values seem marked within one or
another religion almost as a matter of course. As I showed elsewhere,86 what is important
is not the question ‘who are’ the Albanians, whether they are Muslims or Christians,
whether they are tolerant or intolerant, nor to understand the intensity or the nature of
their religious beliefs. It seems more useful to understand how their religious identity is
of use to them, and to understand whether, when, how and why a particular identiﬁcation
may be preferable to another, for example religious belonging as opposed to other possible
means of identifying people.
As we know since the publication of Ethnic Groups and Boundaries,87 what people
chose to do in terms of one or another way of identifying themselves depends on the
social situations in which the identiﬁcation becomes organizationally relevant. As I
showed more speciﬁcally in the context of Albanian society, such an approach may be
useful to reﬁne the meaning of religious and moral values,88 in relation with the social
organization and the social transformation of a given society.89 As I showed more speciﬁ-
cally in a wider Southeast European context, it may also reveal the discriminatory and
stereotyping ideologies that lie behind the categorizing processes of religious aﬃliations
in local, regional or international contexts.90
Conclusion
While analyzing historical reconstructions and public celebrations of religious and politi-
cal legacies in a number of Southeast European countries, the aim of this article was to
frame an argument about the political uses of religion. An articulate analysis of the
main philosophical reﬂections about the contentious relationships between religion and
politics, linked to a careful examination and historical contextualization of media events
86Albert Doja, ’The Politics of Religion in the Reconstruction of Identities: The Albanian Situation’, Critique of Anthropology
20:4 (2000), pp. 421–438. doi:10.1177/0308275X0002000404.
87Fredrik Barth, ed., Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Diﬀerence (London: Allen & Unwin,
1969).
88Albert Doja, ’Honneur, Foi et Croyance: approche linguistique anthropologique des valeurs morales et religieuses’,
Anthropos: International Review of Anthropology and Linguistics 106:1 (2011), pp. 161–172, jstor/23031808.
89Doja, op. cit.
90Albert Doja, ’Instrumental Borders of Gender and Religious Conversions in the Balkans’, Religion, State & Society 36:1
(2008), pp. 55–63, doi:10.1080/09637490701809738.
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in the perspective of political anthropology, can result in a more critical understanding of
the political functions of religion. I argued for a critical approach to the politics of religion
by focusing on the discourses and processes that deﬁne the media events of public celebra-
tions and historical reconstructions. This article could not possibly exhaust the rich and
complex topic of the politics of religion, and certainly, a number of questions remain
open. I oﬀer here a localized account of speciﬁc reﬂections on historical reconstructions
and everyday public discussions, confronted to the actual tense situation in the Balkans,
which may be an indication of the unholy alliance between the politics of religion and reli-
gious entrepreneurs.
Throughout the Balkans, religious stories of Albanians, Serbs, Greeks, and others nor-
mally claim moral and political heritage by selectively drawing upon history to infuse the
everyday life of ordinary people with claims of legitimacy and belonging. The way religious
leaders tell their stories and celebrate media events to promote their political claims sig-
niﬁcantly aﬀects the everyday of the politics of religion, while the escalation of religious
aggressive policies are aimed to radicalize belonging to one or another religion. In this
context, the performative practice of certain religious and political discourses transform
them into media events to construct a representation of religion, which is used increas-
ingly as a justiﬁcation to occupy the public liberal space, which often lead to the use of
violence. It is exactly under these conditions that the essentialism and fundamentalism
of religious and moral values are reaching their peak. Ultimately, the side eﬀect of this situ-
ation seems to be a potential underestimation of the pressing problems at both local,
regional and global levels, for we ought to know, not only how and why it works, but
also how to deal against the instrumental use of the religious politics of nationalism
and fundamentalism.
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